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Pay-for-performance? 
 
An Empirical Investigation of the Relationship between Executive 
Compensation and Firm Performance in the Netherlands 
 
 
A.A. (Bart) Bootsma1 
 
 
Executive Summary 
This paper investigates the relationship between CEO compensation and company 
performance for Dutch listed companies for the period 2002-2007. The study examines if 
absolute or relative changes in CEO pay are related to changes in company performance. 
Furthermore, the study investigates if the pay-performance relationship has strengthened 
after the introduction of the Dutch corporate governance code in 2004. The results suggest 
that the Dutch corporate governance code had a positive effect on the pay-performance 
relationship. This effect is mainly driven by the increased use of equity-based 
compensation. Compared internationally, the pay-performance relationship in the 
Netherlands remains relatively low. 
 
For the full text of this master thesis refer to the following webpage: 
http://hdl.handle.net/2105/6150. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Executive compensation has been a topic of much discussion for a long period of time. 
Continuous debates among employers, employees, regulators and the press about the 
level, structure and role of CEO compensation take place in most industrialized countries 
(Duffhues and Kabir 2008). This political, social as well as academic debate also takes 
place in the Netherlands. It is said that CEO compensation is not sufficiently connected to 
performance: pay-for-failure instead of pay-for-performance (e.g. Couwenbergh 2007).  
 
The main purpose of this study is to examine empirically if there is a relationship between 
CEO compensation and firm performance of Dutch companies listed at Euronext 
Amsterdam during the period 2002-2007. 
 
In the master thesis three research questions have been formulated:  
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1. What are the determinants of the level and structure of CEO compensation? 
2. How strong is the relationship between top executive compensation and company 
performance? 
3. Has the pay-performance relationship strengthened during the period 2002-2007? 
In this paper I will mainly focus on the second and third research question, the strength of 
the pay-performance relationship and its development during the period 2002-2007. The 
results of the first research question will not be presented in this paper.  
 
The research is relevant for several reasons. Previous studies do not show unequivocal 
results. Some studies found a strong positive relationship between CEO compensation and 
company performance (e.g. Hall and Liebman 1998), other research found a weak positive 
relationship (e.g. Jensen and Murphy 1990). There are even a few studies that report a 
negative relationship (e.g. Duffhues and Kabir 2008). 
Few research about this topic has been done conducted on Dutch data. A few notable 
exceptions are the research of Duffhues et al. (2002), Cornelisse et al. (2005), Mertens et 
al. (2007) and Duffhues and Kabir (2008). I hope this study can make a contribution to the 
existing literature, by exploring the topic for Dutch listed companies, an area that has not 
been investigated to its full extent previously.  
It is also of practical relevance to conduct the research for the Netherlands. Since 2004 the 
Dutch Corporate Governance Code (Staatscourant 2004, 250) is effective. This code 
advices a strong connection between compensation and performance of top executives 
(paragraph II.2 of the code). Investigating how strong the relationship is between 
remuneration of top executives and the performance of the company, is useful to monitor 
this aspect of the code (Van Praag 2005).  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 will provide an overview of 
prior literature. Hypothesis development, research design and the sample will be outlined 
in section 3. Section 4 presents the empirical results. These results will be analyzed in 
section 5. Finally, section 6 summarizes the main conclusions of this paper.  
 
 
2.  Prior literature 
In order to provide a structured overview of the empirical studies it is necessary to make 
choices in which studies are discussed and which not. I use several criteria to delimitate 
the overview. First, studies should refer to Europe or the United States. Furthermore, the 
studies should be based on listed companies in a cross-section of industries. Moreover, 
performance of the company should be measured in current financial performance 
measures. The sample should include CEOs. Another criterion is that the empirical studies 
should explain (components of) compensation with performance. Moreover, studies should 
be recent. Literature published before 1998 will not be discussed. An exception is the 
influential study of Jensen and Murphy (1990).  
The papers are used to find out what is best practice in conducting empirical research of 
the pay-performance relationship. The papers show that the relationship differs in the 
selected countries. The results of selected papers are compared with the results of the 
conducted research in section 5. The selected papers and their main findings are presented 
in table 1 on the next page. 
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Table 1: Brief overview of the main findings in the pay-for-performance literature 
 
Authors and 
year 
Country Period Board position Main findings 
Jensen and 
Murphy (1990) 
US 1974-
1986 
CEOs  The relationship between total pay 
and performance, the PPS, is small, 
but positive and significant. 
Hall and Liebman 
(1998) 
US 1980-
1994 
CEOs  A strong pay-performance 
relationship is found based on four 
different methods. 
Conyon and 
Murphy (2000) 
US / UK 1997 CEOs  The PPS in the US is much larger 
than in the UK, mostly because in 
the US more stock-based pay is 
granted. 
McKnight and 
Tomkins (1999) 
UK 1992-
1995 
Highest paid 
executive board 
members 
There is a pronounced link between 
pay and performance for both the 
short and long term. 
Girma et al. 
(2007) 
UK 1981-
1996 
CEOs The effects of the ‘Cadbury’ reforms 
on CEO compensation are 
disappointing. 
Conyon and 
Schwalbach 
(2000) 
UK / 
Germany 
1969-
1994 
CEOs The relationship between CEO 
compensation and firm size and the 
relation between cash compensation 
and company performance is similar 
in the UK and Germany. 
Kaserer and 
Wagner (2004) 
Germany 1990-
2002 
All executive 
board members 
No stronger pay-performance 
relationship due to corporate 
governance changes. 
Yurtoglu and 
Haid (2006) 
Germany 1987-
2003 
All executive 
board members 
together 
Company size is much more 
important in comparison to 
performance to determine the level 
of executive pay. Moreover, a small 
positive PPS is reported. 
Duffhues  
et al. (2002) 
NL 1996-
1998 
All management 
board members 
together 
Positive relationship between 
fraction of management options and 
accounting performance measures. 
Cornelisse  
et al. (2005) 
NL 2002-
2003 
CEOs separately 
and all 
executive board 
members 
together 
No relationship between cash 
compensation and company 
performance. 
Duffhues and 
Kabir (2008) 
NL 1998-
2001 
All executive  
board members 
together 
Compensation is negatively related 
to both accounting- and market-
based performance measures. 
Mertens et al. 
(2007) 
NL 2002-
2006 
CEOs, CFOs and 
other board 
members 
separately 
Small positive relationship between 
short-term bonus and performance. 
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3. Hypothesis development and research design 
This section is structured as follows. First the theoretical background is described in 
paragraph 3.1. The hypotheses are formulated in paragraph 3.2. The research design is 
described in paragraph 3.3. Finally, paragraph 3.4 is dedicated to the sample. 
 
3.1 Theoretical background 
Executive compensation is part of corporate governance. To gain more insight in what 
corporate governance is, a distinction can be made between a business administrative, 
legal, economical and management control view (Strikwerda 2002). Corporate governance 
will be approached in this paper primarily from the economic point of view. Corporate 
governance is from an economic point of view about “(…) the ways in which suppliers of 
finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment” 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1997, p.737). 
 
Agency theory 
If ownership and control are separated in a company, this can lead to conflicts of interest. 
Adam Smith already noticed this in 1776 in The Wealth of Nations (pp.669-700 in Cannan, 
ed. (1937)). The principle of separation of ownership and control has been further 
elaborated by Berle and Means (1932) and has since then played an important role in the 
agency theory. Jensen and Meckling (1976) define an agency relationship as a contract 
under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to 
perform some service on their behalf. This involves for the principal delegating of decision-
making authority to the agent. 
 
Agency theory is based on a number of assumptions: a conflict of interest, information 
asymmetry and different risk characteristics between the principal and agent (Eisenhardt 
1989). The relationship between stockholders and the management of a company is a 
prominent example of an agency relationship. The separation of ownership and control of 
the company with the stockholders as principals and the management as agents gives rise 
to the principal-agent problem. Stockholders have delegated decision-making authority of 
the company to the management. But management has not the same interests as 
stockholders. Stockholders maximize the return on their investment in the company and 
strive to long-term stockholder value creation. For a part management has other interests: 
their own career and welfare. Managers prefer to run large businesses rather than small 
ones, other things equal. This may not be in the best interest of the stockholders, as this 
‘empire building’ may not result in investing in positive net present value projects (Brealy 
et al. 2006). Another problem is managerial entrenchment (Shleifer and Vishny 1989). 
Managers will invest in projects that fit with their personal skills, to improve their value 
for the company. This temptation to overinvest, apparent in empire building and 
managerial entrenchment, is called the free-cash-flow problem by Jensen (1986). 
Information asymmetry is also apparent. Management has more information than the 
stockholders. Moreover, management and stockholders have different risk characteristics. 
In general, stockholders hold a diversified portfolio of stocks and are risk-neutral. 
Managers are for their career and human capital dependent on one specific company and 
are for that reason risk-averse (Mehran 1995).  
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Different solutions are possible to solve the principal-agent problem. Examples are an 
internal control system (e.g. Fama and Jensen 1983), the labor market for managers (e.g. 
Fama 1980; Jensen and Murphy 1990), the market for corporate control (e.g. McColgan 
2001; Jensen and Ruback 1983), the financial structure of the company (e.g. Easterbrook 
1984; Jensen 1986) and executive compensation (e.g. Jensen and Murphy 1990; Jensen et 
al. 2004). This paper focuses on executive compensation as solution to the agency 
problem. The application of performance pay can diminish value destruction (agency 
costs). If executive compensation is based on performance measures that align their 
interest with the interests of the stockholders, the conflict of interest between them can 
be diminished.  
 
Managerial power theory 
The managerial power theory dates back to the work of the famous economist Galbraith. 
Galbraith coined the term “managerial capitalism” in the book The New Industrial State 
(1967). This term refers to the view that managers detain more power and influence than 
the stockholders on the decisional and directional process. Recently there is renewed 
interest in this theory (e.g. Bebchuk and Fried 2004; 2006; Bebchuk et al. 2002; Jensen and 
Murphy 2004).  
Bebchuk and Fried (2004) state that there is “pay-without-performance”. The authors 
explain this with their managerial approach to executive compensation. From this point of 
view, the remuneration of top executives is not an instrument to reduce the agency 
problem, but it can be seen as part of the agency problem. Managers of companies with 
dispersed stock ownership have themselves a substantial influence on their own 
compensation. Due to the dispersed ownership, managers can use their influence to get 
high compensation which is in booming times strongly connected to stock prices and in bad 
economic times not (Bebchuk and Fried 2003). So executive compensation should in this 
theory not be seen as a tool to align the interests between stockholders and managers. To 
understand the processes of setting pay the actual conditions under which pay is set should 
be taken into account. In the agency theory optimal contracting is assumed. Executive 
compensation can only take place at arm’s length contracting, which means careful 
processes and procedures in which the contract consists of incentives to maximize 
stockholder value (Jensen and Meckling 1976).  
The managerial power approach results in sub-optimal incentives and the associated act of 
rent extraction plays a role. Managers with power are able to extract rents and managers 
with more power can extract more rents. Rents are defined as value in excess of what 
managers would receive under optimal contracting (Bebchuk et al. 2002). The amount of 
compensation that is paid to managers is camouflaged from the eyes of stockholders and 
other stakeholders, so that it is no more related to company performance.  
Although the managerial power approach is from a conceptual point of view quite different 
from the optimal contracting approach, Bebchuk and Fried (2003) note that the former 
cannot replace the latter. Compensation packages will be influenced by both market 
influences, which push toward value maximizing contracts and by managerial influences, 
which push toward directions favorable for managers. 
 
 171
3.2 Hypothesis development 
As outlined before, agency theory sees performance-related top-executive compensation 
as a solution to the conflict of interest between stockholders and management. The 
compensation aligns the interest of the management with the objectives of the 
stockholders. So the agency theory is in support of the following hypothesis: 
 
A positive relationship exists between CEO compensation and company performance  (H1) 
 
CEO compensation usually exists of the following elements: base salary, bonus, other 
compensation, pensions, stock options and stocks. The sum of base salary and bonus is 
called cash compensation and the aggregate of all compensation elements is called total 
compensation. The hypothesized positive relationship between CEO compensation and 
company performance is based on the performance-related elements bonus, options and 
stocks. No relationship is hypothesized between base salary, other compensation, pensions 
and company performance. 
 
During the sample period 2002-2007 several changes have been made to the Dutch 
corporate governance system, which may have influenced top-executive pay 
arrangements. Transparency with respect to CEO compensation has increased during these 
years. Until September 2002 the regulation for the disclosure of the remuneration of the 
Board of Directors was very limited. Only the total amount of remuneration to all current 
and former executive and supervisory board members should be reported (Article 383 of 
Book 2 of the Dutch Civil Code). The ‘Disclosure on Remuneration and Stock Ownership of 
Executive and Supervisory Directors Act’ took effect on 1st of September, 2002 (Staatsblad 
2002, 225). The Foundation for Annual Reporting (RJ) published guidelines based on this 
act and on IAS 19 Employee benefits, which prescribe that companies provide information 
in the annual report on granted rights and exercised and expired rights during the financial 
year. The RJ (240.111) requires further that Dutch listed companies provide in the annual 
report information on an individual basis of cash compensation, stock option plans, granted 
options and stock-based compensation.  
Since January 1, 2004 the Dutch corporate governance code (Tabaskblat 2003) came in 
place. This code requires additional information in the annual report about the 
remuneration of management board members. Paragraph II.2 of the code is dedicated to 
remuneration of members of the management board. The amount and composition of the 
remuneration packages as well as the transparency of the compensation are discussed in 
this paragraph of the code. Furthermore, the code advises a strong connection between 
CEO compensation and company performance. Based on the aforementioned changes in 
the Dutch corporate governance system it is hypothesized that: 
 
The relationship between CEO compensation and company performance has  
strengthened in the Netherlands during the period 2002-2007               (H2) 
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3.3 Research design 
In order to calculate the strength of the pay-performance relationship two models are 
used: the pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) model of Jensen and Murphy (1990) and the 
pay-performance elasticity (PPE) model of Hall and Liebman (1998). 
 
Pay-performance sensitivity 
PPS is an absolute measure. It measures with which amount CEO compensation increases if 
company performance increases with €1.000. The PPS ordinary least squares regression 
model is specified as follows: 
 
Δ (Pay)it = α + β Δ (Perf)it + εit           (1) 
 
The dependent variable Δ (Pay)it represents the change in CEO compensation of company i 
in period t compared to period t-1. In section 4 the PPS of cash compensation (sum of base 
salary and bonus) and total compensation (sum of all compensation elements) are 
reported. Delta stock options is computed with the Black-Scholes (1973) European call 
option valuation model, which is modified for dividends by Merton (1973). The change in 
the value of options is taken into account by comparing the value of the options at the 
beginning of the year with the value at the end of the year after Hall and Liebman (1998). 
Delta stocks is also calculated as the difference in value at time t and time t-1. Delta 
stocks is also based on total compensation (i.e. the change in the value of stocks held by 
the CEO is taken into account).   
The absolute change in firm performance is measured in four different ways: delta 
shareholder wealth, delta sales, delta net income and delta operating income. In 
accordance with earlier empirical literature Δ (Shareholder wealth)it is calculated as 
market capitalization at period t-1 multiplied with total stockholder return (TSR) at period 
t (e.g. Jensen and Murphy 1990, Murphy 1999, Mertens et al. 2007). Besides TSR three 
accounting-based measures for performance are used in this equation. After Jensen and 
Murphy (1990) profit and sales are used. Profit is operationalized as operating income and 
net income (Mertens et al. 2007). The research of Mertens et al. (2007) points out that 
these variables are often used by Dutch listed firms as financial performance measures in 
the period 2002-2006. These three accounting-based measures are calculated as the value 
at period t minus the value at period t-1.  
 
Pay-performance elasticity 
The PPE model is expressed in relative terms. It measures the increase in CEO pay in 
percentages, if firm performance rises with 1%. The PPE model is among others used by 
Hall and Liebman (1998), McKnight and Tomkins (1999) and Conyon and Murphy (2000). 
This model can be specified as follows: 
 
Δ LN (Pay)it = α + β Δ LN (Perf)it + εit                           (2) 
 
Δ LN (Pay)it is the natural logarithm of CEO pay of company i at moment t minus the 
natural logarithm of CEO compensation of firm i in the former period t-1. The 
compensation elements are computed in the same way as in the previous pay-performance 
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sensitivity equation. The difference with the PPS model is that the equation is now in 
relative terms by using the natural logarithm.  
The change in performance is measured as the change in shareholder value. The change in 
shareholder value ignores share issues or repurchases and therefore equals the 
continuously accrued rate of return on common stock (e.g. Murphy 1999, Conyon and 
Murphy 2000). Δ LN (Shareholder value)it is calculated as the natural logarithm of (1+TSR) 
at moment t for company i. This computation is also used by Murphy (1999), Conyon and 
Murphy (2000) and Mertens et al (2007). Again, several accounting-based measures are also 
used as a proxy for company performance: Return on assets (ROA), Return on equity (ROE) 
and sales growth. Sales growth is defined as LN sales at moment t minus LN sales at 
moment t-1. This definition is also used by McKnight and Tomkins (1999). Delta ROA is 
computed as ROA at period t minus ROA at period t-1. The same computation holds for 
ROE. This computation is also used by Kato and Kubo (2006) and Mertens et al. (2007). This 
way of calculating, implies that the changes in ROA and ROE are semi-elasticities.  
 
It might be useful to further elaborate on the econometric method. This can explain why 
no control variables are added to equation (1) and (2). Year-to-year performance related 
changes in CEO compensation are typically modeled as:  
 
(Pay)it = γi  +  αit + βi (Perf)it +  εit                 ,i = 1,2,…,N ; t =1,2,…T          (3) 
 
where γi  is a CEO or firm-specific effect that varies across CEOs but does not vary over 
time for a given CEO, αit is a CEO or firm-specific time trend (company size, CEO age and 
tenure, etc.), Perf is a firm performance measure, βi is the coefficient indicating the pay-
performance relationship and εit represents the equation error.  
For relative small times series (T<10) researchers regularly assume that time trends and 
pay-performance relationships are constant across executives/companies. In terms of the 
model this means αi = α and βi = β. Equation (3) can then be re-estimated using fixed-effect 
methodologies or first differences. The result is, not surprisingly, the PPS-model presented 
by equation (1). See Murphy (1999, p.30-31) and Conyon and Swalbach (2000, p.521-522). 
 
Pay-performance relationship over time 
It was hypothesized (H2) that CEO compensation will show a stronger relationship with 
company performance during the period 2002-2007 due to corporate governance changes. 
An important development in that respect was the  Dutch corporate governance code 
(code Tabaksblat) which took effect from 2004. In this study the period 2002-2003 (the 
pre-Tabaksblat period) is compared with the period 2004-2007 (the period after the code 
Tabaksblat came in place). After Girma et al. (2007) a dummy variable δ is added with 
value “0” in the period 2002-2003 and “1” in the period 2004-2007. This dummy variable δ 
measures differences in the change in CEO compensation before and after the introduction 
of the Dutch corporate governance code. Moreover, an interaction variable is added to the 
PPS and PPE model specifications. This interaction variable is computed as dummy variable 
δ times the performance variable. If the link between pay and performance has increased, 
then a statistically significant positive coefficient (i.e., β2 > 0) will be observed on this 
variable.  
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The PPS equation is then adjusted as follows: 
 
Δ (Pay)it = α1 + β1 Δ (Perf)it + α2 δ + β2 (δ *Δ (Perf))it + εit                      (1’) 
 
The PPE equation is then reformulated as follows: 
 
Δ LN (Pay)it = α1 + β1 Δ LN (Perf)it + α2 δ  + β2 (δ * Δ LN (Perf))it + εit              (2’) 
 
I use cash compensation (after Girma et al. 2007) as well as total compensation (after 
Kaserer and Wagner 2004) as dependent variable in these equations. Corporate 
performance is measured as discussed previously for the PPS and PPE model. 
 
3.4  Sample 
The data on CEO compensation have been collected from the website 
<http://www.veb.net/bestuursvoorzitter/> of the Dutch Investor’s Association (VEB). The 
crude assumptions the VEB uses for the parameters of the Black-Scholes formula (risk-free 
interest rate, expected dividend rate and expected volatility) are adjusted. The data to 
calculate the performance-related variables have been collected from the financial 
databases Datastream and Worldscope.  
The original sample consists of 160 companies listed at Euronext Amsterdam during (some 
part of) the sample period 2002-2007. These funds can be listed at the AEX or AMX index or 
are Small Caps or local funds. The total sample consists of 685 year observations (on 
average 4 observations per company). Companies for which compensation or financial data 
were not available for one or more years are eliminated from the sample for those years.  
The regression results are based on CEOs that have been in function during the whole year. 
Comparing compensation for the whole year t with part of t-1 (because the CEO was 
appointed during that year) or with part of t+1 (because the CEO left the company during 
that year) would have a distortive effect on the results. Extrapolating compensation for a 
part of the year would also be arbitrary, especially for variable compensation elements.  
Furthermore, extreme observations are eliminated from the final sample, because they 
have a distortive effect on the results. Outliers are defined as cases which deviate more 
than three standard deviations from the median (Wiggins 2000). The influence of this 
elimination procedure on the number of observations is limited. In none of the models 
more than thirteen observations are deleted due to extreme observations.  
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5. Analysis 
The indicator variable (Dummy) measures changes in the level of CEO compensation before 
and after the introduction of the Dutch corporate governance code. This variable is 
statistically significant in 12 out of 16 model specifications. The interaction variable 
(Dummy*DeltaPerf) is statistically significant in 10 out of 16 model specifications. In one of 
these cases (for the PPS of cash compensation) a negative relationship is found. In all other 
statistically significant cases the interaction variable is positive. These findings indicate 
that the PPS and PPE have changed significantly between the period 2002-2003 and 2004-
2007. The PPS and PPE have increased in the latter period compared to the former.  
 
The results on the PPS model for cash compensation are reported in panel A. The figures 
should be interpreted as follows. In the pre-Tabaksblat period (2002-2003) the CEO 
receives 6,5 eurocents extra per €1.000 increase in shareholder wealth. In the post-
Tabaksblat period (2004-2007) the CEO received 4,2 eurocents less per € 1.000 increase in 
shareholder wealth. So, overall the CEO received 6,5 – 4,2 = 2,3 eurocents extra per €1.000 
increase in shareholder wealth. The overall PPS of cash compensation amounts 1,4, 9,1 and 
4,8 eurocents extra per €1.000 increase in sales, net income and operating income 
respectively. These figures are comparable with the findings of Mertens et al. (2007). 
These authors report a PPS for cash compensation of 2,7, 1,6 6,5 and 4,2 for each € 1.000 
increase in shareholder wealth, sales, net income and operating income respectively. 
The results on the PPE model for cash compensation (panel B) show that the CEO receives 
in the pre-Tabaksblat period 0,207% extra cash compensation for a 1% increase in 
shareholder wealth. In the post-Tabaksblat period the CEO receives 0,086% less cash 
compensation for a 1% increase in shareholder wealth. However, this finding is not 
statistically significant. For the whole period 2002-2007 the PPE amounts then 0,2047 – 
0,086 = 0,121. For sales, ROA and ROE the PPE amounts 1,155, 0,004 en 0,002. Again, 
these figures are in line with the findings of Mertens et al. (2007). The PPS and PPE of cash 
compensation have decreased after the introduction of the code Tabaksblat for delta 
shareholder wealth. This finding does not hold for the accounting-based measures.  
The results on the PPS model for total compensation (panel C) show that CEOs received in 
the pre-Tabaksblat period 11,6 euro cents total compensation for a €1.000 increase in 
shareholder wealth. In the post-Tabaksblat period the CEO receives 16,1 euro cents extra 
total compensation for each €1.000 increase in shareholder wealth. So, the PPS for total 
compensation amounts 11,6 + 16,1 = 27,7 euro cents for an increase in shareholder wealth 
of €1.000. The PPE relationship between shareholder wealth and total compensation 
(panel D) amounts in the pre-Tabaksblat period 0,138. The PPE has increased with 0,434 to 
0,572 in the post-Tabaksblat period. The accounting-based measures do also show 
increases after the introduction of the Dutch corporate governance code. 
 
Changes in the value of options and stocks contribute to a large part to the total PPS and 
PPE. The increase in the PPS and PPE for total compensation is mainly driven by the 
increased use of equity-based compensation in recent years in the Netherlands (cf. 
Swagerman and Terpstra 2007). For cash compensation, mainly driven by bonus, no large 
increases (even a decrease for delta shareholder wealth) are reported after the 
introduction of the code.   
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Although the results should be interpreted carefully due to the limited number of years 
that are compared, they suggest that corporate governance changes have improved the 
pay-performance relationship in the Netherlands. This is in contrast to the findings of 
Kaserer and Wagner (2004) for Germany and Girma et al. (2007) for the UK. However, the 
pay-performance relationship still remains weak compared to the US. Jensen and Murphy 
(1990) report a PPS of about 30 dollar cents for every $1.000 increase in shareholder 
wealth. The overall PPE measured by Hall and Liebman (1998) for US companies is ranging 
from 1,2 in 1980 to 3,9 in 1994. 
 
The explanatory power of the PPS and PPE models that are used to investigate the strength 
of the pay-performance relationship is comparable to previous research. The limited 
overall explanatory power (Adjusted R2) has several reasons. In the first place, only 
financial performance measures are analyzed. Qualitative/individual objectives are not 
included in the regression analyses. As pointed out by Mertens et al. (2007) the ratio 
quantitative/financial versus qualitative/individual measures amounts in the Netherlands 
around 70%/30%.  
Another possible explanation is given by Perry and Zenner (2001). This explanation is 
especially relevant for bonuses. Bonus is measured as a linear function of performance. In 
reality bonus-plans are fixed-target plans in which executives do not receive any payoff 
until they reach a lower bound of the performance measure. Between the lower and the 
higher bound, the bonus increases linearly with the performance measure. Beyond the 
higher bound and the maximum bonus, additional performance is not reflected in the 
bonus. Such features can reduce the explanatory power of the models.  
 
Hypothesis 1, assuming a positive relationship between CEO compensation and company 
performance, and hypothesis 2, assuming a stronger relationship after the introduction of 
the Dutch corporate governance code in 2004, can not be rejected based on the empirical 
results presented in this paper. 
 
 
6. Summary and conclusions 
This study contributes to the growing literature on CEO compensation by analyzing data 
from the Netherlands. The timeframe 2002-2007 provides an interesting scenario for the 
Netherlands. The Dutch corporate governance system changed significantly during this 
period of time. An important development with respect to CEO compensation in the period 
has been the introduction of the Dutch Corporate Governance Code in 2004. Since 1998-
2001, the research period of Duffhues and Kabir (2008), the level of corporate governance 
in the Netherlands has improved.  
 
The available theoretical framework and previous empirical studies do not provide a clear-
cut picture on the pay-performance relationship. On the one hand, the agency theory 
assumes a positive pay-performance relationship. On the other hand, the managerial 
power theory will not necessarily result in a positive pay-performance relationship. 
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The remuneration data of CEOs of a large sample of Dutch listed firms during the period 
2002-2007 is analyzed. The strength of the pay-performance relationship has been 
investigated based on the PPS model of Jensen and Murphy (1990) and the PPE model of 
Hall and Liebman (1998). The sensitivity and elasticity of cash compensation (i.e. the sum 
of base salary and bonus) are mainly driven by delta bonus. Changes in the value of options 
and stocks contribute largely to the PPS and PPE of total compensation (i.e. the aggregate 
of cash compensation, options and stocks).  
Although the results should be interpreted carefully, the data suggest that the Dutch 
corporate governance code, which took effect in 2004, had a positive effect on the pay-
performance relationship. Compared internationally, the pay-performance relationship in 
the Netherlands remains relatively low. 
 
This study is subject to several limitations. These limitations are mentioned in such a way 
that they can be addressed in future research.  
First of all this research is only based on CEO compensation. In reality, firms are run by 
teams of managers. It may be interesting to extend the research with other members of 
the management board (e.g. Aggarwal and Samwick 2003).  
Another limitation concerning the data is the relative small size of the sample and the 
limited time period for which compensation data are available (since 2002). This will result 
in a lower quality research compared to American studies like Hall and Liebman (1998). 
This study has focused solely on financial (accounting and market-based) performance 
measures. However, recent evidence indicates that companies make increasingly use of 
non-financial performance like for instance customer satisfaction and market share (e.g. 
Ittner et al. 1997; Banker et al. 2000). These non-financial performance measures affect 
CEO (cash) compensation as indicated by Davila and Venkatachalam (2004). 
Endogeneity may be a problem in this study. Future research can use a simultaneous 
equation framework to mitigate the endogeneity problem. 
Finally, stock option valuation is a major limitation of this study. Several more or less 
trivial assumptions had to be made in order to use the Black-Scholes formula to value stock 
options. The estimation of the value of stock options is not controlled for conditional 
compensation. Conditional compensation means that during the vesting period of the 
options several performance criteria have to be met and the actual number of options 
awarded depends on the extent to which the performance criteria are met. The 
conditionality can be based on the rank in a peer group, earnings per share, (relative) TSR, 
etcetera. Especially after the introduction of the Dutch corporate governance code 
(paragraph II.2.1 and II.2.3) in 2004 this conditionality is more common in compensation 
contracts in the Netherlands. 
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